3. The return to the homeland of the new identity and the development of a nationalism based on neo-Hellenism, opposed both to Eastern Christianity and Islam, a selffashioned European modernism whose identity is built on the continuity of the essence of Western culture in the Greek population. The nationalist movement was very much the work of students returning from the West with the new ideals, and it was supported by European philo-Hellenists. The movement took the form of the renaissance of Greek history, a practice of continuity with the past, with language, and with folklore. Throughout the 18th century the practice of giving Greek names to newborn Romii babies became common, and the names were most often of classical origin, for example, Pericles, Themistocles, Xenophon (Michas 1977:64) . And this was accompanied in Europe by a virtual explosion of interest in things Greek-a fantasy of classical culture in the midst of an elegant nature. The fashion for all things Grecian knew no bounds: "Grecian odes, Grecian plays, Grecian costumes, Grecian wings, Grecian pictures, Grecian furniture" (Mango 1965:36) .
The position of modern Hellas was conceived in terms of descent from the classical period and collaterality with modern Europe, from whence the Greeks received the knowledge of their true descent as primordial Europeans, bearers of civilization (Michas 1977:67-68) . "We the descendants of the glorious Hellenes received from [them] our ancient heritage" (Michas 1977:67) .
In order to diffuse this identity to the population, making it, for the first time, Greek national, the usual mechanisms were employed. Besides the rebaptizing of the newborn, folklore and general education played a central role.
It is known that in Homeric antiquity ... the basic food was, according to Homer, baked barley flour. Corresponding today, the basic food of the Greek people is bread. [Kyriakides 1968:77] The former self-classification of Hellene as barbaric and heathen, now transformed into the ultimate in civilization, could only be accounted for in terms of Eastern oppression.
But if the Greeks were degraded, this was surely because of tyranny and superstition. If only they could be freed from the Turks and from their own deplorable clergy... then the Greeks would immediately regain all their ancestral purity and virtue. [Mango 1965:37] The practice of Greek identity, the continuity with the classical period, and the latter's essence as Indo-European and especially Western, was the agenda of a rising hegemonic Europe in the larger world. Today, in the decline of the latter, it is suddenly becoming clear the extent to which Orientalism is a product of the practice of Western self-identification in a hegemonic space where the other was silent. Even the holiness of Greek ancestry has come into question in the work of Bernal (1987) , who has seriously questioned the European origins of Greek civilization. While even these latter-day authors labor in the name of truth-value, it is inescapably certain that there is a connection between the clustering of such works and the dissolution of Western hegemonic identity. A further step is taken, of course, by those Western-educated Third World scholars who today, after years of engagement in modernity, argue for a reestablishment of other forms of knowledge production and rules of discourse (in Abaza and Stauth 1990) .
The constitution of Greek national identity cannot be understood as a local evolution. It is the result of a complex interaction of identifications in an arena in which regions were in a process of transformation with respect to one another and, as a result, in a process of internal transformation. As a macro-process it involved the cosmological repositioning of the population of the Greek peninsula-its integration-peripheralization in the expanding polity and economy of Western Europe, which identified this area as its generalized ancestor. As this identification was transferred to the peninsula it operated a transformation of "Romans" into Greeks and the forging of a historical continuity between these populations and the image of classical Greece as the embodiment of the essence of European modernity.
Should we all laugh at this as cynical modern anthropologists? Most of us find it difficult to do so. Others, the proud and free cynics, would insist, no doubt, on the universal mystification of all national identity expressed in this kind of historical process. I would point out that, in one sense, all identity is, as the cynics might also proclaim, no more than this. I would also point out that all of this historical process is not a simple game of names and classifications, but a deeply context-bound process in which the real continuities are present in the form of identities that are construed in relation to people's immediate conditions and everyday existences. The continuity that makes the forging of social identity possible is encompassed, here in no uncertain terms, in a global process that links major socioeconomic transformation to the constitution of cultures and nations, to the reconfiguration of the map of the world's peoples.
The Present into the Past: The Hawaiian Movement
Hawaii might not appear a likely candidate for a comparison with Greek nationalism, but, in its differing position, it does shed considerable light on the problems under consideration here, the relation between the construction of identity and larger global processes. Hawaii, too, was integrated into a larger imperial structure, even if the terms of the integration were considerably different and occurred during a much shorter period of time. European contact led initially to the consolidation of the islands by means of military aid by one particular paramount chief. Following the consolidation and centralization of power, the islands were incorporated into the Pacific sandalwood trade, which totally dislocated the local economy by sending off masses of commoners to the mountains to collect the wood instead of producing food; at the same time, chiefs assembled increasingly in the port of Honolulu to indulge themselves in conspicuous consumption of foreign imports and mounting debt, which ultimately drove them all into bankruptcy. Disease and economic crisis, finally, drove the Hawaiian people into abject poverty and disaster. Under the increasing control of American missionaries, Hawaii was gradually transformed into a colonial-puppet constitutional monarchy in conditions of catastrophic population decline, the growing whale trade, experiments with sugar plantations, and a rising interest in transforming the islands into American property. The conversion of the islands into a sugar-based economy led by congregationalist missionaries providentially reoriented to the necessity of economic gain led to the disenfranchisement of the Hawaiian population, the importation of massive numbers of Asian plantation workers, and, finally, the coup d'6tat led by American residents that overthrew the Hawaiian royalty and rapidly led to the integration of the islands as a U.S. territory. Hawaiians disappeared from the cultural map from the late 19th century up to the late 1960s, when a number of global processes began to reverse themselves and Hawaiians began to come into their own.
Hawaiian history in the 19th century was primarily the work of missionary-trained Hawaiians and White residents. It consisted in the creation of a past set out in opposition to the Christian world of modernity. This history is what we might identify as myth, and the genealogy of the chiefs and their exploits becomes increasingly detailed when combined with recent memories of the court of the last pre-Christian paramount, Kamehameha. In Western terms, this is a work of folklore and folklorization whose contours define the demarcation of the traditional from the modern. Some of these able historians were also engaged in social debate. Malo, for example, in newspaper articles, expressed his dismay over the power of the Europeans in Hawaiian government and society (Malo 1837 (Malo , 1839 . While he was clearly oriented to the modern and condemned much of his own tradition, he also stressed the technological achievements of his people. In the 1850s, when disease was decimating a population that had sunk from perhaps 800,000 to 50,000 after half a century, Malo expressed the beginnings of a Hawaiian identity in opposition to the dominant American presence, but one that was fragmented by its ambivalence to the ways of the Whites. There is no clear image of a previously functioning social totality, [94, 1992 but there is a clear process of self-definition that develops up through the period of the overthrow.
The The Hawaiian double minority (classified now into a rapidly dwindling pure Hawaiian and larger part-Hawaiian population) became the subject of numerous pessimistic studies of acculturation amid scandalous schemes to provide them with homesteads in marginal areas. While the image of the noble savage still appeared in novels, music, and media representations, Hawaiians themselves were busy identifying out. Numerous interviews with older Hawaiians reveal this to be a common practice.
Following World War II, the declining sugar industry was increasingly supplanted by mass tourism, which became the new staple of the economy. Hawaii was incorporated as a state of the union in 1959. Trade-union-based democrats and the Japanese-American population became ever more dominant in Hawaiian affairs. Hawaiians were now totally marginalized in this multiethnic paradise of the Pacific, rife with simulacra of tropical fantasies, a hula often performed by Tahitians and other islanders, staged hotel luaus, night cruises, Hawaiian statuettes of the gods Lono and Ku from workshops in the Philippines, and other paraphernalia of tourist imagery. Hawaiians, lumpenized and marked by the stigma of class, filled the ranks of the unskilled hotel labor force and, more especially, a growing pool of welfare recipients.
The tourist industry began to stagnate in the mid-seventies as the United States as a whole, following defeat in Vietnam, increasing competition from both Europe and Japan, entered a steep decline, a process that we have previously analyzed in terms of a general decentralization of capital accumulation in the world economy and a consequent breakdown in American hegemony. This was a period of student movements, the explosive advent of Black and Red power. It was also the period of the Hawaiian cultural revival, a process that has culminated in the formation of a nationalist organization that has gained increasing support from a local population that has increasingly begun to identify, or reidentify, as Hawaiian (Friedman 1992a) .
I have discussed the development of the Hawaiian movement elsewhere (Friedman 1992a (Friedman , 1992b , so I limit myself here to some remarks on the relation between the reconstitution of Hawaiian identity and the reconstruction-repatriation of the Hawaiian past. Much of the identity that has emerged is by opposition to Western society and is rooted in a historical distinction between Hawaiian life forms and those that became dominant in the islands. This is a life-and-death issue in cultural terms since the Hawaiian population, following decimation, was thoroughly integrated into the margins of a plantation society and then into the modern capitalism of the 50th state. Many, not least of whom are anthropologists in quest of exotic wholes, have assumed that there are no Hawaiians at all. They have gone to the libraries and archives and are suspiciously perplexed by signs of cultural continuity (and "where did you learn your Hawaiian ... at the University"!). The continuity of Hawaiian culture that can be found among urban, semiurban, and rural Hawaiians, who form numerous enclaves throughout the islands, is not the kind of"culture" either the anthropologists or the tourists had in mind. The Western opposition defines Hawaii as pre-Cook Hawaii, an ancient paramount chiefdom or kingdom, with grass huts, fish ponds and taro fields, and feather capes and all the items to be found in the Bishop Museum. Hawaii has already been folklorized by Western scholars, a project that, in the past century as in this, has included numerous native intellectuals. But this is the past defined and controlled by the West, the objective past. And for the knowledgeable expert, modern Hawaiians as well as tourist simulacra are equally unauthentic. This is so even for those who have been supportive of Hawaiian rights.
The positions of the mirrors involved in the recapture of Hawaiian identity by Hawaiians express a relation of conflict over the right to appropriate the past in the name of contemporary identity.
Modernist versus Hawaiian Constructions ofHawaiian Identity
From the modernist point of view, Hawaiian culture is already defined academically as the social order that predated contact with the British. This culture has been written and fashioned throughout the 19th century and is enshrined in a number of classical volumes and museum collections.
Hawaiian society disintegrated and its population practically disappeared as a political reality with its integration into the American hegemony. In such terms, Hawaiian culture, in its authenticity, ceased to exist shortly after the turn of the century.
There is, thus, an absolute and unbridgeable gap between modern Hawaiians' selfdesignated culture and the true culture that they have lost. Their only access to this culture is via the Western and missionary Hawaiian texts of the past, or the synthetic works of modern anthropologists and/or archeologists.
The Hawaiian movement harbors its own constructions of the past that are fundamentally at odds with those of official representations. While for some it is a question of reinstating the past, for most there is an essential continuity that has been increasingly culled from the mouths of the elders, kupunas, and which stresses three fundamental related complexes:
1. Ohana is the extended family, based on a principle of sharing and solidarity. Here there is no exchange, since one gives oneself to the others, and expects the others to do likewise. This is a question of the merging of selves in a larger collective life project and not of balanced reciprocity.
2. Aloha is the principle of committing oneself to the needs of others and is the principle of organization of the ohana, but it can also be understood as a general strategy of personal relatedness.
3. Aloha aina expresses the principle when applied to the land. Love of the land is the relation of man to a sacred nature upon which he is totally dependent and for which he has to care; the concept of malama or caring, as in stewardship, is central to aloha aina. ' These complexes are instrumental aspects of Hawaiian identity today, and they are clearly continuous with what might be described as tendencies toward Hawaiian closedcorporateness that may have emerged in the 19th century and that might be accounted for as social defense mechanisms in face of an encroaching plantation society. Whether the ohana predates the colonial period is difficult to ascertain. It might be argued that this closed corporate culture is itself generative of the principles of sharing, love of the land, and extended family, although I would argue for a good deal more historical continuity here. But this need not imply an opposition between pre-and postcontact Hawaiians. These complexes were more probably merely accentuated and elaborated in the process of social transformation and reaction to crisis and oppression. They are disauthenticated only by a discourse predicated on the opposition between pristine and colonial, just as potent as that between traditional and modern. While academics discuss the degree to which Hawaiian chiefs were despotic murderers and are convinced that Hawaiian militants have an entirely idyllic representation of their past (Linnekin 1990:22) , my experience is that Hawaiians are quite aware of the nature of chiefly power and regularly discuss it among themselves. There are those who oppose chiefly power as contrary to the ideals of ohana. There is a common opposition between good and bad chiefs, between those with and without aloha. This is often combined with an opposition between pre-and postcontact Hawaii, between traditional chiefs and sellouts. The great chief Kameha-meha is often depicted as either a prototypical modern paramount or a more ambivalent figure who shied away from the consequences of the encroaching Western realm.
One indigenous reformulation of the Hawaiian past consists in the projection of the essence of Hawaiian culture onto the precontact period. This is combined with migration stories to further differentiate Hawaiian history in a way that accommodates the undenied fact that the Hawaii of the 18th century was not a simple expression of the above principles or complexes. The original society-based on these principles, possessing no images of deities and only two gods, Hina and Ku, and whose chiefs practiced true alohapredated the first invasion from Kahiki, or Tahiti. The latter installed the principles of warfare, class power, and human sacrifice as well as numerous tiki, or images of gods. The successive onslaughts of British, Americans, and now Japanese are reenactments of the same scenario. This is not a mere invention, as some anthropologists and historians might assume. The representation expresses what might be argued to be a deep division in Hawaiian society that may have existed in late precolonial times, if not earlier.
It is worth comparing the representation of the relation between people and rulers in Hawaiian mythology with the similar structures that are found in many other parts of the world. The myth of sovereignty based on the invasion of foreign, youthful chiefs from overseas or from a distant land is not an unusual phenomenon. The scenario, found in Western Polynesia, Fiji, Indonesia, and Central Africa, to name a few examples, contrasts an indigenous people ruled by generous ritual chiefs to conquering political chiefs who represent politico-magical power and military violence and who are associated with external relations. In these latter cases the myth seems consistently to correspond to a polity organized in terms of exogamously ranked aristocracies, a relative lack of exploitation between lineages, and open exchange of prestige goods between ranks connected by marriage. The Hawaiian elite of the late precontact period was, by contrast, highly endogamous, exploitative, and the adamant enemy of regular exchange between ranks. It is reasonable to suppose that the image of the "stranger king" would embody a real conflict in such situations. The notion of sovereignty in Western Polynesia was based on an alliance between the chiefs of the land, representatives of the people, and the foreign chiefs of the sea. This alliance is ambivalent, pitting the encompassing ritual status of the "land" against the aggressive conquering power of the sea. In Hawaii, however, there were no chiefs of the land and the people-not, at least, in the late period. Rather, the war chiefs literally incorporated, by sacrifice, the eternally returning image of Lono, god of the land and "people." If, for example, the ritual of chiefship includes the defeat of the sea chief by representatives of the land in Fiji, the opposite is the case in Hawaii. If, in the former, political power is encompassed by ritual status, in the latter, ritual status is incorporated into the being of the political chief (Friedman 1982 (Friedman , 1985 . That Hawaiian society became truly class-divided as a result of contact is evident in numerous examples of real conflict and exploitation. Descriptions from the 1820s reveal the extent of aristocratic power in the postcontact situation.
Two thirds for the proceeds of any thing a native brings to the market, unless by stealth, must be given to his chief; and not infrequently, the whole is unhesitatingly taken from him. ... The poverty of many of the people is such that they seldom secure a taste of animal food, and live almost exclusively on taro and salt. A poor man of this description, by some means obtained the possession of a pig, when too small to make a meal for his family. He secreted it at a distance from his house and fed it till it had grown to a size sufficient to afford the desired repast. It was then killed, and put into an oven, with the same precaution of secrecy; but when almost prepared for appetites, whetted by long anticipation to an exquisite keenness, a caterer of the royal household unhappily came near, and, attracted to the spot by the savoury fumes of the baking pile, deliberately took a seat till the animal was cooked, and then bore off the promised banquet without ceremony or apology. It is a more elaborate illustration of a subaltern discourse that, I think, can be traced backward in time, one that was and is generated by a systematic class relationship. The opposing of the complex of ohana and aloha to the oppression imposed by the projects of dominant elites would appear to be a historically embedded practice rather than a mere invention of the past decade.
The construction of the Hawaiian past by Hawaiians is an aspect of a project of delinking from the larger world that has obliterated a population and absorbed its history into the projects of Western academic historians and anthropologists. While anthropologists entertain an opposition between a pristine precolonial chiefly system and a Western-imposed modernity, Hawaiians construe their history as a series of usurpations by foreign conquerors opposed to the original unity of love and generosity, "man" and nature that characterized the pre-Tahitian era. And that original unity is the core of their contemporary identity, the core of Hawaiian community, and the antithesis of the negative reciprocity of modernity in which they are engulfed.
The Hawaiian stands firmly in the present, with his back to the future, and his eyes fixed upon the past, seeking historical answers for present-day dilemmas. Such an orientation is to the Hawaiian an eminently practical one, for the future is always unknown whereas the past is rich in glory and knowledge. [Kame'eleihiwa 1986:28-29]
Comparing Constructions of Identity
In the Greek case, a past defined by outsiders is used to forge a viable cultural identity in the present. In the Hawaiian case, the past defined by outsiders is denied, and a cultural identity of the present is employed to forge a viable past. At one level this is simply a question of positioning and strategy. The Greek elite was working its way into the West and extricating itself from the Ottoman Empire. The Hawaiian movement represents an attempt to extricate itself from the West and establish a self-centered autonomy. This is a difference between a politics of integration and a politics of disintegration. While neoHellenism discovered its identity in the gaze of the other, Hawaiian nationalists seek theirs within themselves, in reaction against the other's gaze. As a play of mirrors, the two strategies would appear to be opposed to one another, the former assimilating another's image of its own past to become what it is not, the latter projecting what it is onto a past whose image belongs to another. But, as I have stressed, this is not a game in opposition to real life. It is deadly serious, as might presumably have been discovered by a certain, perhaps mythical, French psychoanalyst who delighted in peeling away the identity of his patients until they discovered, rightly, in the intellectual sense, that they were nonexistent and committed suicide. Not just individuals, but populations have been known to mysteriously eradicate themselves from the face of the earth after losing their ontological foundations. So this is not a question of semiotics, of sign substitution, of the intellectual game of truth-value and museological authenticity. It is, rather, a question of the existential authenticity of the subject's engagement in a self-defining project. The authentically constituted past is always about the transition from today to tomorrow.
The Space of Modernity
The contrast between Greek and Hawaiian constructions of their histories details the relation between different kinds of identity formation. An important aspect of the distinction between the two cases is located in the historical and systemic positions of the two populations. Greek nationalism was an aspect of the incorporation of Greece into an expanding West and into a world of modern Western values of which classical Greece was the appointed ancestor. Greek identity was simultaneously a product of its separation from the Ottoman Empire. The process was one of global reorganization of the economic and political map of Europe. Hawaiian identity has reemerged in a period of declining Western hegemony. It does not participate in the establishment of modernism but is opposed entirely to the latter. Greece had a favored position, ideologically, in the emergence of a new imperial system that simultaneously eliminated many previous cultural identities from the face of the map. In this current era of roots, "Dances-with-Wolves," and the ethnification of college curricula, emergent cultural identities represent alternatives to a modernism that has apparently failed. If Greece might be said to have represented the future in the past, Hawaii has come for many to represent the past in the future.
The purpose of the contrast was not simply to establish an interesting comparison but to suggest a global systemic connection, an articulation between local and global processes in a definite temporal dimension. The same connection provides a framework for examining the current crisis in anthropology. The confrontation of anthropologists with native self-defining groups is not a hazard of the ethnographic endeavor but a reflection of a deeper transformation of the world in which we live. I suggest that this current situation in which authority to represent others is threatened is a systemic product of cyclical and tendential movements in the world system.
Reactions to the Current Crisis
Anthropological practice, in its ethnographic format, consisted in the classification of the "peoples" of the world, the attribution of specificity to bounded populations. This kind of activity is no longer unproblematic. It has exploded from the inside and imploded from the outside (Friedman 1991a) . There would seem to be a growing skepticism if not disbelief in our identifications, while "they" are busy identifying themselves and making their own histories.
The reactions to this situation and the ensuing discourses are of several different kinds. The self-reflective postmodernist reaction appears to have consisted in concerted attempts to capture the ethnographic experience if not that which the ethnographic experience was supposed itself to have captured in a previous era. This has been variously reproached as narcissism as well as back-door attempts to retain ethnographic authority without the benefit of a tame ethnographic object. Another, more earnest attempt to come to grips with the problem has consisted in a self-consciously dialogic ethnography, or even attempts at providing methods of working in contemporary global realities (Marcus 1989 (Marcus , 1992 . A third reaction, more modernist in tone, has consisted in a kind of negative retrenchment. If anthropologists previously defined the world in terms of Western cultural categories, these can now be attacked at the same time as it is shown that ethnographic modernity is truly modern, that it bears only superficial resemblance to a past that many previous ethnographic "objects" are attempting to revive in a newfound subjectivity. The "invention of tradition" is a double-edged sword that criticizes the assumptions of cultural continuity while implicitly reprimanding those who would identify with such cultural fantasies today.
The identity space of modernity might be described in terms of two sets of polar relations: modernism/postmodernism and traditionalism/primitivism (see Figure 1) . This scheme is not designed to categorize people or any other substantive social actors but to delimit a hypothetical field of available identifications specific to Western modernity and to allow a clearer understanding of reactions to modernity as internal to it. The following description is admittedly oversimplified for the purposes of illustration rather than argument (Friedman 1988) .
Modernism embodies a strategy of distantiation from both nature and culture, from both primitive or biologically based drives and what are conceived of as superstitious beliefs. It is a self-fashioned strategy of continuous development in which abstract rationality replaces all other more concrete foundations of human action. Traditionalism, I have argued, is, in statistical terms, the most attractive solution for a Goethean alwayson-the-move subject who no longer has anywhere to go. It opposes the alienated freedom of modernity and attempts to reinstate the values and cultural fixity of a supposedly lost world. Primitivism opposes modern existence as a form of social control to the free creativity of nature, the human potential expressed in the form of libido, the traditionalist's "pornotopia" (Bell 1976:51) . All culture in such a view is envisaged as a form of power. Postmodernism is an intellectual reaction against the anti-culture and anti-nature content of modernism. It is positively inclined to all forms of wisdom, libido liberation, creativity, lost values, and communion with nature. While modernism is hegemonic in periods of real hegemonic expansion, there is a tendency to trifurcation in periods of crisis. In such conditions modernism tends to extremes of rationalism and developmentalism in a desperate attempt to ward off the two great enemies of human progress, superstition and self-gratification, which loom ever larger as the future begins to close in on the present and the past takes on a nostalgic aura of sanctuary.
Anthropologists are, I assume, as real subjects in the world, as much a part of this quadruple polarization process as any other member of our "declining" civilization. Since anthropology is located at the defining edge of Western selfhood, it is especially sensitive to the vectors of identity formation that characterize the space of modernity, even though, as a "scientific" discipline, it strives to maintain an objective distance from its ethnographic reality. The reactions discussed above can be distributed within this space. Primitivism and traditionalism have both been evident throughout the history of anthropology. Traditionalism can be associated with the early reaction, as it appears in the Boasian framework, to classical evolutionism. Cultural relativism often harbored a critique of modern civilization, and it sometimes moved in the direction of primitivism (Sapir 1924) . But it has also tended to envisage modernity as yet another culture, most often as national culture, sometimes as capitalist culture (Sahlins 1976). In primitivism the modern appears as the structured and disciplining power of the state (Clastres 1977), as the absence of a holistic relation to nature (Bateson 1972) , and as the loss of meaning and authenticity (Sapir 1924; Diamond 1974) . In contrast to traditionalism, the primitivist argument tends to interpret primitive culture as an instrument of basic human needs or an expression of a human (natural) essence. Some of the self-declared postmodern discourse is in many respects a self-conscious primitivism (Friedrich 1982; Tyler 1984) . Traditionalism is expressed in the form of value-laden relativism that emphasizes the special merit of cultural difference and defends the latter against the homogenizing power of modernity. Its intellectual expression takes the form of cultural determinism, and a relativism that is positively enamored of reducing differences to cultural essences.
Postmodernism as such is best expressed, perhaps, in the work of Clifford, who has systematically distanced himself from any form of fixed meaning, although there is evidence of a nostalgia for a former order that has been dissolved by a globalizing modernity. He finds hopeful refuge in the notion of creolization, that the homogenizing spread of Western culture articulates with the rest of the world in the production of yet a new generation of cultural differences; "Westerners are not the only ones going places in the modern world" (Clifford 1988:17) . His nostalgia concerns the decline of pure cultures, if there ever were any such animals. It is reflected in his line, "The pure products go crazy" (1988:1). He is also clearly cognizant that the situation today concerns the decline of the authority to represent in the postcolonial world (Clifford 1988:8) .
Clifford is clearly cognizant of the larger context (partly a function of distantiation) of the anthropological enterprise in today's world. There is no clear resolution to this problem. None, certainly, is offered, nor even a glimpse of a possibility. If I designate Clifford's discussion as quintessentially postmodern it is because he presents his situation in terms of the decline of a modernity of authoritative discourses and accepts, even promotes, the multivocality of identifications and self-identifications that have begun to crowd a formerly hegemonic and homogeneous field of representation. No solutions are available here, only the contemplative distancing of the observer of observers of actors observing one another and acting accordingly. Clifford survives the crisis by retreating to the contemplation of acts of representation while at the same time being careful not to propose any representation of his own other than the polyphony of others' representations.
But the usual situation in which the anthropologist must find himself is the modernist impasse described earlier. This is because modernism is the dominant condition of academic praxis. It is in the nature of scholarly investigation that the scholar becomes convinced of results, not being fully aware of the presuppositions of the academic or research strategies involved. But what, after all, are anthropologists doing when they write the history of the X? What kind of meaning is being constructed and for whom? This must be investigated if we are to escape the hubris of self-evidence that characterizes much of the anthropological discourse surrounding the confrontation with "native" visions of their own culture and history.
As indicated above, no individuals or schools can be simply classified in terms of the four polar types. The latter represent significant points in a larger space, a space that allows us to chart variations in identity as well as clarifying the logical content of modernity as a cultural construct. Traditionalism, in the anthropological form of culturalism, and modernism both partake in the ethnographic authority that is today under attack, while primitivism and postmodernism relinquish that authority in principle, at least, by accepting the legitimacy of the voice or text of the other (see Figure 2) .
Modernism versus the Construction of Social Selfhood
The specificity of modernist discourse regarding the making of history is based on objectivism-that there is a real, narrative history, documented or not, but which is the ultimate source of all historical discourse to which the scientific subject has access. The modernist strategy is based on a clear division of space into the real and the represented. The latter implies that statements about reality can be measured in terms of their truthfulness, their degree of correspondence to real events. The notion of invented tradition, culture, or history in such an approach is simply the application of this model to our own representations; that is, the demystification of our own history. Whatever form this exercise may take, it always results in the demonstration of the constructed character of representations and therefore the assertion of their falsity and, by implication, their mystificatory character. When applied to any form of human identity, this is powerful medicine. Marx practiced it on the representation of wealth in capitalism. Freud practiced it on the myths of individual identity, and more recently Lacan has made the demystification of all ego identity the cornerstone of his work.2 Modernist approaches to social and cultural identity have followed suit. Besides Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), there are such clear positions as Gellner (1983), for whom cultural identity is a kind of false consciousness that cannot endure the secularization-rationalization of modernity. In a different vein, Anderson (1983) construes the modern nation as an imagined community, as a symbolic organization creating a collectivity for which there is no concrete social basis. The spate of articles and collections on ethnicity in the past few years reflects not only the logarithmic growth of new and revived cultural identities, but also the modernist deconstructionism of intellectuals who have reacted to the tidal wave of ethnicity and roots that has engulfed their identityless, if not alienated, existences. We must grasp this as a social reality in order to understand why the interest looms so large. The very fact that the modernist intellectual stance has been under such severe attack is proof enough that not everyone subscribes to such an approach to reality. I have suggested, above, that it is only one of three polar strategies in a modernity in crisis. But its internal logic seems to harbor two very definite characteristics. First, it ascribes truth and therefore authority to itself, the scientifically knowing subject. Second, on this basis, it divides the world of representation into objective truth versus folk or ideological models of the world. And the objective world represented in the work of the scholar is, in essence, a transparent image, whereas all other images are opaque, transfigured, and, by implication, false. This approach may work in periods of hegemony, when anthropologists can speak or write the [1988:206] Here is the clearest expression of the view that movements aimed at the reconstruction and reestablishment of cultural models are necessarily the work of modernized charlatans who select and folklorize true culture in terms of misinterpretations generated by their modern interests. And when such neotraditionalist ideologues get their polluted claws on their own past, they produce a mythological paradise lost, rather than the true history of the "people without history."
More than a negation of history or a sudden and incomprehensible (because total) cultural amnesia, it is a refusal to grasp the historical dimension of the relationship native societies have sustained with the West since cultural contact. [Babadzan 1988:208-209] This is an extreme position, perhaps, but it exemplifies the fundamental traits of the Western modernist view of knowledge, which might be summarized as a series of propositions about the world.
1. The Truth is singular. There is but one true version of the past. 2. The past consists of an arbitrarily chosen segment of a temporal continuum ending with the present moment.
3. The structure attributed to this past is the product of a specific kind of research carried out by those competent in the field.
4. This structure is objective and corresponds to proposition 1, that is, it is singular. 5. All other structures or interpretations attributed to the past are, by implication, ideological in the sense of misrepresentations.
The "native's point of view" is thus a mere folk model that is the royal road, perhaps, to the native unconscious, to the deep structures of the alien culture, but is never of any scientific value as defined in terms of the above paradigm. This is not a mere question of a personal point of view, but a structurally positioned discourse. While Babadzan represents something of a pure form of this discourse, the less hardened variants to which we shall refer clearly belong to the same family.
Keesing, for example, has, in his engagement in the political conditions of Melanesians, attempted to grasp the positive aspects of culturally defined power struggles by pointing out the specifically political aspect of cultural movements such as Kastom. He invokes Gramsci as well as Guha in analyzing such movements as subaltern phenomena that involve the reversal of signs attributed to a single classificatory scheme imposed by a once-dominant colonial power. Similarly to Babadzan, he stresses the colonial classificatory origin of the categories of identity in terms of which Melanesians struggle today. But, while seeking to understand the terms of struggle, he also argues for a more purely modernist stance.
A deeply radical discourse (one that questions basic assumptions) would aspire to liberate us from pasts, both those of our ancestors and those of (colonial or other) domination, as well as to use them as political symbols. [1989:25] Here again is the notion that representations of the world, both past and present, must be transparent in order to be serviceable in political terms.4 There is, of course, a truth in this, the truth that implores us not to engage in witchcraft accusations in times of colonially or postcolonially generated crisis, but to engage the true enemies, the real problems. But this is also a normative engagement, one that appears rational since it is based entirely on the premise of context-free rationality in a universe that does not exist, not even in our own corners of the world. People engaged in reconstituting (or constituting) themselves do not want to be liberated from their pasts (Trask 1991:164) , and it might be argued that the transparency required by Keesing (1991a Keesing ( , 1991b is totally incompatible with the forging of cultural identity. In any case it must lead to confrontation due to the necessary emergence of conflicting definitions of reality where the anthropologist, like it or not, is representative of the center of authority as against those who are engaged in constructing their own identities. ogy. Yet we sense that there is an absolute incompatibility between the disauthentification of culture implied in the demystification of cultural-historical constructs and the identity of those doing the constructing.
F. Allan Hanson, writing of the "making" of the Maori, has also tried to demonstrate the way in which the construction of myth or history is an invention, or in his terms, a "sign substitution" (Hanson 1989:899) . Hanson explicitly adopts the kind of postmodernist line referred to above, that is, he refuses to accept, at least in principle, a fixed criterion of truth-value, which he interprets as "logocentrism," following Derrida (1967; Tyler 1991) . While the argument explicitly stresses the uneventfulness of inventions, which he equates with the normal course of cultural change, the brunt of the discussion cannot be interpreted other than as a demonstration of the fact that various traditions, including "the great fleet" story of the immigration to New Zealand and the cult of Io as the supreme god, are relics of Western missionaries and that their current place in Maori self-identification is somehow nothing more than the internalization of foreign representations of the Maori. In one sense, the endeavor of the anthropologist is to demonstrate that the categories that inform our ethnography are not based in empirical data but are imposed by our ideology's classification of the larger world. But the text itself cannot be interpreted in any other sense than as a falsification of the constructions of Maori selfidentification. It is based on an absolute distinction between something aboriginal and something impure, mixed, Westernized, and while the general argument is that there is no difference, the effect of the article is to reinforce precisely such a difference. One reason for this is that the process of invention is never in question. If foreign representations are assimilated to Maori self-identification, the process by which this occurred is not an issue, [94, 1992 only the product, as if a story such as the Hawaiiki, or a migration from ancient Israel, were a discrete object like any other ethnographic object. There are neither motivations, nor a strategy of appropriation-transformation, nor a process of identification that might make sense out of this apparently neutral process that simultaneously harbors the connotation of falsity. Needless to say, this article provoked a reaction that found its way into the pages of the New York Times, to say nothing of the numerous local newspapers of the region. 5 Linnekin represents an interesting case of a longer-term confrontation with native activists. In an early article (1983) her position is clearly in the camp of the "invention" school (Handler and Linnekin 1984) . Tradition is here envisaged as a constantly changing product of current circumstances, which would imply that it is necessarily "false" insofar as it is a socially organized projection of an ever-changing present onto a supposed past. But in discussing the Hawaiians she suggests another definition of tradition where it "properly refers to the precontact era" (Linnekin 1983 She tempers her approach in such a way that Western authority is not definitive but negotiable while never succumbing entirely to indigenous self-representations, "a discomfort that we may have to live with" (Linnekin 1990:25) . It represents, as such, a compromise (for her) where some categories can be deconstructed but not others, or at least where one should be expected to be attacked by some militants, if not by all, for one's interpretations. But in her examples, the former and apparently still dominant vision of the opposition between the knowing scholar and the excited student or militant reemerge-as when ancient gourd helmets, very unlikely associated with warfare, are depicted today as part of a warrior-hero, bodybuilding, pit-bull owning image of "tradition," at least as it all occurs on T-shirts (Linnekin 1990:24) . The merits and faults of Hawaiian paramounts are similarly discussed, and Linnekin assures us that she presents an image to her students that is neither euphoric nor damning, although she does "lean to the Edenic" (1990:22) , and this, evidently, as the result of objective research. Thus, in spite of cautions and a certain unease concerning the whole academic project, the latter discourse is still fashioned by authoritarian parameters. And the problem is not one of attitudes, but of structure. If one is engaged in "negotiating culture," that is, involved in the construal and interpretation of ethnographic or historical realities, then one is bound on a collision course with others for whom such realities are definitive. Culture is supremely negotiable for professional culture experts, but for those whose identity depends upon a particular configuration this is not the case. Identity is not negotiable. Otherwise, it has no existence.
In all of these cases, modernism has come into direct confrontation with others' construction of their identities. This is not an error, a misinterpretation by the media or by the "natives" themselves. It is a necessary structural relation between professional anthropological identity and those segments of the world that are concerned to produce their own identities. One cannot combine a strategy of empirical truth-value with a sensitive politics, simply because the former is also a political strategy. I am not arguing against science here, but against an inconsequential posture, itself an outcome of the confusion of academic and real politics. Only Keesing has adopted an openly consistent position. For the others the confrontation takes the form of a conflict between the academy and the street. An anthropology that is engaged in the lives of other people and takes seriously the political conflicts involved in struggles for cultural identity ought not perhaps to be concerned with defining other peoples' cultures by means of independent interpretations of gourd helmets and historical texts. The engaged modernist may come into "authentic" conflict with others in seeking to demystify the world. The academic modernist is more concerned to preserve the authority of the scholar, the monopoly of the truth about the world for the sake of knowledge itself. One critical anthropologist has recently responded by asking, "Is anybody out there?" (Sutton 1991:91) .
My argument has consisted in trying to demonstrate the relation between Western modernism and the construction by anthropologists of other peoples' identities and histories. I have been especially concerned to show that the crisis of modernity has generated a number of variations on this identity-postmodernism, traditionalism, primitivismwhich are not external to Western identity space but its defining polarities. It is among the modernists and the culturalists (neotraditionalists) that the question of authority looms largest, and it is among such practitioners that the question of the right to represent the past has become such an important issue. As we have implied, the question of ownership is a question of who has the right to define another person's or population's culture. In a global perspective, this question has arisen because the hegemonic structure of the world is no longer a reality, and with it, the homogeny that was its cultural form is also dissolving. This is a world-systemic phenomenon, rather than the result of an internal development in anthropology or in Western culture as such. 
Identity and the Construction of History

Conclusion
I have, as stated from the outset, investigated two aspects of the relation between social identification and the making of history. The first concerned the relation between the social conditions of identity formation and the production of culturally viable pasts. The second introduced modern so-called scientific constructions of other peoples' pasts into the same frame of argument. "Objective" history in this discussion isjust as much a social construct as any other history, and it cannot be simply accepted at face value. If, as we have suggested, all constructions of the past are socially motivated and have, thus, to be understood in positional terms, then we can begin to come to grips with the currently agonistic relation of anthropology to the contested realities of formerly silent others. This necessitates a comprehension of locally specific logics of self-construction as well as the interaction and even constitution of the latter in a larger arena. Since the attribution of meaning and construction of cultural models is a motivated practice, our own purported truth-value vision of history and ethnography must be understood in terms of the way in which it is produced, if we are to place it alongside the way other people produce their own visions. The ideas that culture can be negotiated and that invention is a question of sign substitution, a kind of cognitive exercise in pure textual creativity, are linked to a structure of self and of culture that is perhaps specific to capitalist modernity. Elsewhere, I, among many others, have argued that these concepts are dependent upon a prior experience of the division between subject and role (identity) reflected in the division between private and public and expressed in notions, such as representativity, in which symbols "stand for" something other than themselves, as opposed to a situation in which they are immediate realities (Friedman 1989b; Campbell 1987; Sennett 1974) . This is the difference between the ritual mask that contains the power of the god and the theater mask that is a mere representation, a symbol or image of that which it represents. Modernity implies the separation of symbol from that to which it refers. The notion of culture as code, paradigm, and semiotic is very much a product of modern identity. Some of the cynical dismissal of other peoples' constructions of their pasts is merely a product of modernist identity in defense of itself. 7
Similarly, contemporary roots, ethnicity, and even racism are various forms of traditionalist reaction to the above. It has not been my purpose nor my interest to pass judgment on the relative value of the discourses involved, although my own objectivist position ought to be obvious in the endeavor to grapple with the confrontation between modernist anthropologists and their subjects from the outside, so to speak. That position is a product, as I most readily admit, of a specific Western social context. The global perspective embodies a self-conscious avoidance of the polar identifications discussed. In maintaining a strict identityless position, it also strives to understand the constitutive processes of social identity and the cultural structures generated by the latter. This must include the simultaneous attempt to understand the modern identity that produces our own discourses. In a world where cultural fragmentation has taken on extremes that might be seen as alarming, the kinds of phenomena addressed here ought to be of crucial importance. The establishment or, as nationalists would argue, the reestablishment of Greek identity and history was an immediate and necesssary aspect of the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire and the integration of the Greek peninsula into a rising Western hegemony. The current fragmentation of the world system is a larger-scale phenomenon. It might also represent a transition to a new hegemonic structure. In any case, in order to understand such processes we need, I think, to gain the broader, global perspective I have [94, 1992 proposed. The motivation for this approach is the aspiration to comprehend where we have come from and where we are going. And it would appear that we are all actors in this process whether we like it or not. In the absence of such a perspective we might well be plunged into the very identity struggles that we most urgently need to begin to understand.
Constructing the past is an act of self-identification and must be interpreted in its authenticity, that is, in terms of the existential relation between subjects and the constitution of a meaningful world. This relation may be vastly different in different kinds of social orders. It is also a practice that is motivated in historically, spatially, and socially determinate circumstances. The latter in their turn are systemically generated in a larger global process that might help us to account for the vicissitudes of identity contests that have become so pervasive in this period of global crisis and restructuring. JONATHAN FRIEDMAN is Professor, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Lund, S-211 00 Lund, Sweden.
Notes
'Other well-known concepts, such as kapu (sacred/forbidden), mana (life-force), and ho'okipa (hospitality), are closely related to the above concepts. The mana of the land and sea, the kapus that must be observed in relation to it, the ho'okipa that founds community, are all intimately related to the relations of encompassment, dependency, and unity that are expressed in ohana and aloha.
"2Hegel was, of course, first in this endeavor, in attempting to demonstrate the alienation of any specific or concrete identity, but his holism belies a project that is quite the contrary of objectivist demystification.
3Anthropologists have taken great pains to distance themselves from the project of disauthentification implied in their discourse (Linnekin 1991a) . But no disavowal adequately redresses the effects ofdemystification. That all societies and most individuals tend to mystify themselves in constructing pasts based on present conditions, motivations, and desires ought to imply that the truth of a particular representation of the past is important only in relation to a clearly defined baseline, an "objective" reality. The modernist universe is one in which contestation is central to the accumulation of knowledge about the word, objective knowledge in the Popperian sense (Popper 1972) . But if representations have other functions than that of representing, the modernist must necessarily appear as a spoiler. The truth of histories is only relevant in a universe of discourse based on comparison with alternative versions. By adopting a modernist (i.e., falsificationist) paradigm, one has also engaged oneself in the politics of other peoples' self-representations.
4The notion of transparency refers to an implied absence of distortion in the relation between that which represents and that which is represented. "5Since this article was written, a number of debates have blossomed among anthropologists themselves as to the nature and political significance of the identification of other people's invented traditions. That ethnographic identity or authority is truly in jeopardy in these discussions vindicates our argument (Levine 1991; Linnekin 1991b; Hanson 1991; Jolly 1992) . Those who would support Hanson's position can do so only in terms of the expertise of the anthropologist as ethnographer or historian. The problem with the defense of the invention thesis is that it is self-contradictory. If all culture is invention then there is nothing with which to compare a particular cultural product, no authentic foundation. It implies a serious contradiction between the often-asserted commonality of cultural creativity and a discourse that consistently attributes inauthenticity to modern cultural products. 6In a deeper sense, our ultimate goal as human beings ought to be to grasp precisely cultural production from the inside, on the basis of a project of the unification of humanity in its diversity, at least at the level of understanding. But this should only make sense for those trying to understand, not for those who become the object of that understanding and whose problems might be totally irrelevant to this anthropological project. What must, however, be eliminated, as Wendt puts it, is the pretension to such an understanding without the benefit of dialogue. Only other people can know ultimately what is going on inside of them. It would be absurd to presume otherwise, as absurd as it is implicit in authoritative discourse itself. 7We have implied that there are different ways of attributing meaning founded on different practices of self-constitution. Identification with the Lost Tribes of Israel, for example, which has oc-curred among a great many societies under the influence of certain missionary denominations, cannot be dismissed in terms of our own views of world history and of the Bible. It must be understood in terms of specific acts of attribution of meaning in definite historical contexts. The power and status of missionaries in many societies has rendered them and their sacred books sources of lifeforce and well-being for societies in disintegration, most often as the direct and indirect result of their presence. Coming from the Holy Land, descended from the People of the Book is a source of sacred identity in a situation where the Book itself is the expression of the strength or mana of the superordinate colonial power.
